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ARTICLES
MONEY LAUNDERING AND DRUG TRAFFICKING: A,
QUESTION OF UNDERSTANDING THE ELEMENTS OF
THE CRIME AND THE USE OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE
Thomas M. DiBiagio*
I. INTRODUCTION
Drug trafficking in the United States generates millions of
dollars in cash profits daily.1 The cash generated from narcotics
trafficking usually follows one of two distinct paths. Domestical-
ly, the profits are converted into usable currency by disguising
the association between the cash and the narcotics enterprise.
Monies not spent domestically are transferred back to the nar-
cotics source or drug cartel to be enjoyed by the drug traffickers
and to provide operating capital for the enterprise.2 This con-
* Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Maryland. BA., 1982,
Dickinson College; J.D., 1985, University of Richmond. The views and opinions ex-
pressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect those of the
Department of Justice.
1. For example, on May 8, 1993, The New York Times reported that several
suspects linked to Columbian drug traffickers were arrested in New York. Agents
involved in the investigation estimated that the drug conspiracy took in more than
one million dollars a week. Craig Wolff, Authorities Arrest Five In Drug Raid, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 8, 1993, at A23.
2. This system was described by Ian Fisher, in his article, A Window on
Immigrant Crime, N.Y. TIMSS, June 17, 1993, at B1. In discussing the drug traffick-
ing activity of Columbian immigrants in the Jackson Heights section of New York
City, the article included a detailed discussion of the appendage money laundering
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version and transfer process has become known commonly as
money laundering.
As part of the overall law enforcement crackdown against
narcotics trafficking, federal agents inveterately have pursued
money laundering investigations and prosecutions against drug
traffickers by following the audit trails left by transactions and
transfers involving drug profits.' The federal money laundering
statute has been the primary tool used to prosecute money
laundering activities arising out of drug trafficking.
There are two principal tasks involved in any federal money
laundering prosecution arising from drug trafficking. The first
task is to understand the complex elements of the statute. This
complexity imposes a significant evidentiary burden on the
prosecution. First, the prosecution must prove that the funds
involved in the transaction were drug proceeds. Second, it must
be shown that the defendant knew the funds were drug pro-
ceeds. Third, the prosecution must show that the defendant had
knowledge of or intended to carry out the illicit transaction. In
enterprises:
Jackson Heights is also the home to Little Columbia-where high level
drug dealers operate and where much of their cash is laundered through
travel agencies and wire transfer services that line Roosevelt Ave-
nue . . . . Officials believe that the amount of illegal cash that washes
through Jackson Heights could reach into the billions each year . . . law-
enforcement officials realized that the travel agencies, wire transfer cen-
ters and change houses were actually the most visible sign of the drug
trade. Officials say the stores launder hundreds of millions of dollars
each year, mostly sending cash electronically to South America ....
Id.
Recently, narcotics officers in New York City moved against an international
heroin ring. The drug enterprise was estimated to have been selling $30 million
worth of heroin annually in the United States. These drug profits were laundered
back to Europe by shipping the cash in false bottomed shipping containers. Selwyn
Raab, Police Arrest 60 in Raids To Break a Heroin Ring, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1993, at
B3.
3. Stephen Labaton, Auto Dealerships Seized In Capital: 19 Arrested and Assets
Held on Charges of Laundering Cash From Narcotics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1993, at
A18 (money laundering charges brought against car dealership after federal agents
posing as Columbian cocaine traffickers bought dozens of cars on the pretext that the
transaction was intended to conceal narcotics profits); Robert Pear, 3 Nations Stage
Anti-Drug Sweep, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1992, at Al (reporting millions of dollars in
drug proceeds seized in international narcotics and money laundering crackdown); Tod
Robberson, DEA Money Laundry Pressing on in Panama, Drug Cartels Get Along
Without Noriega, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1993, at A20 (stating that Columbian drug
traffickers continue to launder billions of "narcodollars" through Panamanian banks).
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light of this burden, circuit courts have recently held that cir-
cumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain the critical ele-
ments of the charge.. Consequently, the second task involves
understanding the extent to which circumstantial evidence can
be used to prove the three central elements of the offense.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1956
The federal money laundering statute is set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 1956.4 This section is divided into three main provi-
sions or subparagraphs. Generally these provisions prohibit the
knowing involvement in a financial transaction or transfer in-
volving proceeds of a "specified unlawful activity." The statute
either expressly includes or incorporates by reference virtually
every major federal criminal offense as a specified unlawful
activity. Included among these specified unlawful activities is
drug trafficking.5 The central concern of the money laundering
statute, as applied to drug trafficking, is to reach those core
financial transactions and transfers in which an attempt is
made to use drug proceeds to facilitate a drug trafficking enter-
prise; or in which an attempt is made to conceal or disguise the
source of the funds; or to evade state or federal currency trans-
action reporting requirements.
A. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)
Generally, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) prohibits a broad array of
domestic financial transactions involving drug proceeds. There
are three elements which make up a subsection (a)(1) charge:
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1992). The definition of "specified un-
lawful activity" set forth in § 1956(c)(7) also includes: murder, kidnapping, gambling,
arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, counterfeiting, theft, em-
bezzlement, fraud, and obstruction of justice. The 1992 Amendments deleted wire and
mail fraud from the definition. Id. § 1956(C)(7)(D).
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(1) knowing involvement; (2) in a financial transaction;6 (3)
involving drug proceeds.7
The requirement that the defendant engage in a financial
transaction is not a perfunctory element, and a conviction will
be reversed if this element is not satisfied. Mere possession of
drug money does not support an inference that the defendant
intended to conduct a transaction." However, an attempt to
conduct a transaction or to transfer funds is enough to prove a
transaction under the statute.9
In United States v. Fuller,0 the defendant was convicted of
money laundering under the evasion provision of §
1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) and the sting provision of § 1956(a)(3)(B)(ii). At
trial, the government introduced evidence that the defendant
boasted of his ability to set up a money laundering scheme."
The defendant was subsequently introduced to an undercover
agent.'2 The agent told the defendant that he was "seeking
assistance from [the defendant] in getting [drug proceeds] in
and out of a banking system in such a way that cash would be
sanitized, i.e. any illegal taint would be removed and the cur-
rency reporting forms would not have' to be completed."
13
6. A "financial transaction" is defined as a transaction which either: (1) involves
the movement of funds in interstate or foreign commerce; or (2) involves the use of a
financial institution which is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. § 1956(0)(4)
(Supp. IV 1992). The 1992 Amendments expanded the definition of financial transac-
tions to include transactions in which title to real property, a vehicle, a vessel, or an
airplane changes hands without the payment of money. Id.
The term "transaction" is defined in § 1956(c)(3) and includes virtually any pur-
chase, sale, gift, or transfer of property. Id. § 1956(C)(3) (Supp. II 1992). With respect
to a financial institution, the term includes any disposition of funds involving a finan-
cial institution. A "financial institution" is defined in § 1956 (c)(6). This definition
adopts the broad definition set forth in 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (1988) and includes
any individual, securities broker or dealer, bank, or any institution dealing in or
exchanging currency. Id. § 1956(C)(6) (Supp. IV 1992).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1992). The actual language of the statute
prohibits financial transactions involving "property" representing the "proceeds of some
form of unlawful activity." Id.
8. See United States v. Ramirez, 954 F.2d 1035, 1040 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 3010 (1992).
9. See United States v. McLamb, 985 F.2d 1284 (4th Cir. 1993).
10. 974 F.2d 1474 (5th Cir. 1992).
11. Id. at 1476.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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The defendant indicated that he would be willing to set up
the following money laundering scheme: the money would be
loaned to a Bahamian based insurance company in exchange for
debentures; the transaction would be secured by a mortgage on
a Texas property owned by the insurance company; and in
exchange for the loan, the insurance company would assist in
setting up an offshore corporation into which funds could be
deposited and withdrawn without the filing of any currency
transaction: report.'4 The defendant advised that he would de-
scribe the funds to be camouflaged as monies obtained from a
Brazilian land transaction. 5 The defendant also stated that
his fee would be twenty percent of the funds laundered, but
offered the agent a declining sliding scale rate tied to the vol-
ume of funds delivered. 6
The agent met with the defendant on two subsequent occa-
sions. The last meeting was held in a hotel room. 7 During
this meeting the agent gave the defendant $97,500 in cash with
the instructions that it be laundered. The defendant was arrest-
ed as he attempted to leave the room. 8 At trial, the defendant
took the stand and admitted that, although he knew the money
was drug money, he intended to steal it, not to launder it.9
The jury rejected the defendant's argument and convicted him
of money laundering."
The defendant appealed his conviction. On appeal the defen-
dant did not dispute his knowledge that the money was drug
proceeds or that the money laundering scheme was intended to
conceal or disguise the source of the funds.2 ' The defendant
asserted that he merely held the funds and that he did not at-
tempt to conduct a financial transaction.' The Fifth Circuit
rejected the defendant's narrow reading of the statute. The
court looked beyond his receipt and possession of the funds and
considered the defendant's three meetings with the undercover
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id at 1477.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1475.
21. Id. at 1478.
22. Id.
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agent, his detailed description of the money laundering scheme,
and the numerous steps taken by the defendant to set up the
convoluted transaction in his attempt to avoid a currency trans-
action report.' The court held that the defendant's conduct
went well beyond mere possession and clearly showed an at-
tempt to conduct a transaction.2
The definition of financial transaction under § 1956(c)(4)
requires that the transaction affect interstate commerce. The
link between the transaction and interstate commerce may be
remote, collateral or incidental. In United States v. Koller,'
the defendant was convicted of money laundering based on two
transactions. 26 The first transaction involved the purchase of a
$2,000 money order with drug proceeds. The second transaction
occurred when the defendant used the money order to pay his
girlfriend's restitution obligation.2 1 In connection with the pay-
ment of this obligation, the defendant gave a false first
name.2 ' The defendant was convicted under the concealment
provision of § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and subsequently appealed on the
ground that the government failed to prove a financial transac-
tion under the statute.29 The court first ruled that the pur-
chase of the money order involved a financial transaction under
the statute, but that it did not satisfy any of the specific intent
provisions.' However, the court found that the payment of the
restitution obligation was a financial transaction under §
1956(a)(1). The court also found that the interstate commerce
element was satisfied because the bank that issued the money
order was involved in interstate commerce.3 The incidental
involvement of the bank was sufficient to establish the prereq-
uisite interstate nexus.12 Finally, the court found that by giv-
ing a false first name the defendant intended to conceal the
true ownership of the funds.3
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1478-79.
25. 956 F.2d 1408 (7th Cir. 1992).
26. Id. at 1411.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1410.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1411.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1412.
33. Id.
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In addition to proving "knowing involvement in a financial
transaction involving drug proceeds,"' the prosecution is re-
quired to prove that the defendant intended either to: (1) facili-
tate the drug trafficking enterprise; (2) violate I.R.S. § 7201 or
§ 7 2 0 6 ;' (3) conceal or disguise the source or ownership of the
funds; or (4) avoid a state or federal currency transaction re-
porting requirement."
B. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(B)
Section 1956(a)(2)(A) prohibits the international transporta-
tion or transfer of funds with the intent to promote a narcotics
enterprise." The three elements which make up a §
1956(a)(2)(A) violation are: (1) the international transportation
or transfer; (2) of a monetary instrument or funds;8 (3) with
the intent to promote a narcotics enterprise. Thus, under sub-
section (a)(2)(A), the government must prove that the defendant
intended to promote the drug trafficking enterprise by transfer-
ring or transporting the funds. The express language of §
1956(a)(2)(A) does not, however, require that the government
prove the funds were drug proceeds. The government need only
prove that funds, illicit or legitimate, were transported or trans-
ferred to promote or contribute to the growth and capitalization
of the drug trafficking activity.39
34. Id.
35. I.R.C. §§ 7201, 7206 (1988). The tax return evasion, failure to file, and false
statement provisions are set forth in I.R.C. §§ 7201-06. Because this specific intent
provision is rarely relied on in a money laundering prosecution arising out of drug
trafficking, this provision will not be included in the detailed discussion to follow.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
38. The term "monetary instrument" as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(5) includes
cash, checks, money orders, securities, or negotiable instruments. Id. § 1956(c)(5)
(Supp. IV 1992).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) only addresses international transfers of funds. A
domestic transfer would fall within the purview of § 1956(a)(1). However, because the
prosecution does not need to prove that a § 1956(a)(2)(A) transfer involves drug pro-
ceeds, an anomaly emerges relating to the burden of proof. For example, a wire
transfer of $100,000 in legitimate fimds from New York to Nigeria to buy heroin
would violate § 1956(a)(2)(A). In contrast, the wire transfer of the same funds from
New York to Miami for the same purpose would not violate § 1956, because this
domestic transfer would not involve drug proceeds.
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Unlike § 1956(a)(2)(A), a transfer under § 1956(a)(2)(B) must
involve drug proceeds. There are three elements to a §
1956(a)(2)(B) charge: (1) the international transportation or
transfer; (2) of a monetary instrument or funds; (3) with the
knowledge that the monetary instrument or funds represent the
proceeds of drug trafficking. In addition, the government is
required to prove that the defendant intended to either: (a)
conceal or disguise the source or ownership of the funds;0 or
(b) evade a state or federal currency transaction reporting
requirement.4
Thus, § 1956(a)(2)(A) and § 1956(a)(2)(B) violations are
distinguishable on two points. First, a transfer under §
1956(a)(2)(A) need not involve drug proceeds whereas the
transfer under § 1956(a)(2)(B) must involve drug proceeds.
Second, each provision has a different specific intent provision.
A transfer under § 1956(a)(2)(A) must be intended to facilitate
the narcotics enterprise. For example, the wire transfer of
legitimate funds to a bank account overseas to purchase
narcotics would violate § 1956(a)(2)(A).42 In contrast, under §
1956(a)(2)(B) the transfer must be designed to conceal the
source of the funds or intended to avoid a cash transaction
report. An example of a transfer under § 1956(a)(2)(B) would be
the wire transfer of drug proceeds overseas under a false name
or by a nominee/third-party.
C. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)
Section 1956(a)(3)4 is commonly known as the "sting" provi-
sion of the money laundering statute. A conviction under this
40. Id. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i).
41. Id. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii).
42. See United States v. Monroe, 943 F.2d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 1585 (1992) (involving wire transfer of funds to Hong Kong to pur-
chase marijuana); United States v. Hamilton, 931 F.2d 1046, 1052 (5th Cir. 1991)
(holding that transfer of legitimate funds by foreign drug cartel into bank account in
United States intended to provide capital necessary for expanding drug enterprise
would violate § 1956(a)(2)). A § 1956(a)(2)(A) violation appears to have been involved
in the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. As part of the conspiracy,
$100,000 was wired from Germany and Iran to the individuals in the United States
involved in the bombing. Ralph Blumenthal, $100,000 Is Linked to Trade Center Sus-
pects, N.Y. TIMES, April 25, 1993, at A41.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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subsection requires that the defendant (1) conduct a financial
transaction; (2) with property represented by an undercover
agent or confidential informant to be drug proceeds or with
property used to conduct-or facilitate a drug transaction." This
subsection also adopts three of the four specific intent provi-
sions of § 1956(a)(1). Therefore, the government must prove
that the defendant conducted the financial transaction with the
intent to: (1) facilitate the drug enterprise; (2) conceal or dis-
guise the nature or ownership of the funds; or (3) evade a state
or federal currency transaction reporting requirement.'
D. Specific Intent
The money laundering statute is not a money spending stat-
ute. The mere purchase of an asset with drug proceeds without
an intent to facilitate, conceal, or evade would be a transaction
scrutinized under forfeiture laws, not the money laundering
statute." To be a violation of § 1956,4" the government must
prove that the transaction or transfer was intended to fulfill
one of the specific intent provisions set forth in the particular
charging provision.
1. Facilitation
To prove an intent to facilitate, the defendant must be shown
to have engaged in the transaction with the intent to promote
the drug trafficking enterprise.48 Typically, this subsection is
aimed at prosecuting the defendant based on his intent to "re-'
invest" the drug profits back into the criminal enterprise. An
example of a transaction intended to facilitate a drug traffick-
ing enterprise would be the purchase of vehicles, firearms,
houses, pagers, mobile telephones, boats, or other items to be
44. Id.; see also United States v. Fuller, 974 F.2d 1474 (5th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Breque, 964 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1253 (1993).
'45. See United States v. McLamb, 985 F.2d 1284 (4th Cir. 1993).
46. The federal forfeiture laws, 18 U.S.C. § 981 and 21 U.S.C. § 881, are effective
compliments to a money laundering prosecution and punitive on their own, when the
evidence cannot sufficiently establish the requisite intent to establish a § 1956 prose-
cution.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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used by the defendant in connection with his narcotics traf-
ficking.49 However, an intent to facilitate can be found in a
broad array of transactions involving drug proceeds. What must
be shown is that the transaction itself or the fruit of the trans-
action, in whole or in part, was intended to facilitate the nar-
cotics enterprise." If at the time of the transaction the defen-
dant was not involved in drug trafficking, but later used the
residence, boat, truck, or car to facilitate his drug dealing, he
would most likely not be subject to a § 1956 charge.5' Howev-
er, his property would be subject to seizure under the civil52 or
criminal forfeiture statutes.53
In United States v. Munoz-Rumo,M the defendant was con-
victed of money laundering under the facilitation provision of §
1956(a)(1) based on his purchases of a residence, truck, and
automobile with drug proceeds. At trial, the government first
addressed its burden of proving that the purchases were made
with drug proceeds by demonstrating that: (1) the defendant
had limited income; and (2) the defendant was engaged in drug
trafficking during the period of time the transactions at issue
were conducted.55 Next, the prosecution showed that the defen-
dant used these items in furtherance of his drug trafficking
activity by evidencing that: (1) drug proceeds were stored at the
residence; (2) trips to purchase drugs were taken in the truck;
and (3) the defendant dealt drugs out of the car.55 On appeal,
the court found that the government had presented sufficient
evidence to sustain its burden on both points.57
In facilitation cases, the drug proceeds are often commingled
with legitimate funds. The money laundering statute does not
require the prosecution to prove that the funds used in the
49. See United States v. Cruz, 993 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1993) (involving a vehicle
purchased with drug proceeds which was subsequently used to distribute narcotics).
50. See United States v. Skinner, 946 F.2d 176, 177-78 (2d Cir. 1991) (purchase
of postal money orders with drug proceeds and subsequent use of these monetary
instruments to pay for cocaine was held to be financial transaction intended to facili-
tate drug dealing).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
53. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
54. 947 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992).
55. Id. at 177-79.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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transaction charged came exclusively from drug activities.58
Thus, the government need only prove that a portion of the
cash was drug proceeds. In United States v. Jackson,"9 the de-
fendant used addicts to sell crack cocaine from two houses he
had "repaired" and "revitalized" in a run-down section of East
St. Louis. During the course of the defendant's drug trafficking,
he deposited drug proceeds, together with funds obtained from
other non-drug activities, into two separate bank accounts. The
accounts were in the name of a development corporation and a
church." The defendant used and withdrew funds from these
accounts (specifically, checks were drawn on the account) to
obtain and maintain pagers and a cellular telephone.61
At trial, the prosecution established that these pagers were
used in connection with the defendant's drug trafficking. The
defendant was subsequently convicted of conspiracy to distrib-
ute crack cocaine and laundering drug proceeds pursuant to §
1956(a)(1).62 The money laundering charge was based on the
series of checks drawn on the accounts used for cellular tele-
phone and paging services, rental payments, and cash.'
On appeal, the defendant argued that the government failed
to establish that the monies used in the pertinent transactions
were derived exclusively from drug trafficking.' The Seventh
Circuit rejected the defendant's contention and held that the
statute did not require the prosecution to prove that the funds
used in the transactions came exclusively from drug pro-
ceeds.65 The court held that the government need only prove
that the transaction "involved," in whole or in part, drug pro-
ceeds.66 The appellate court explained that to hold otherwise
would permit drug traffickers to prevent their own conviction
simply by commingling drug proceeds with legitimately derived
funds:
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
59. 935 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1991).
60. Id. at 836.
61. Id. at 836-37.
62. Id. at 837.
63. Id. at 836-37.
64. Id. at 839.
65. Id. at 839-40.
66. Id. at 840.
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We do 'not read Congress's use of the word "involve" as
imposing the requirement that the government trace the
origin of all funds deposited into a bank account to deter-
mine exactly which funds were used for what transaction.
Moreover, we cannot believe that Congress intended that
participants in unlawful activities could prevent their own
convictions under the money laundering statute simply by
commingling funds derived from both "specified unlawful
activities" and other activities. Indeed, the commingling in
this case is itself suggestive of a design to hide the source
67of ill-gotten gains that the government must prove ....
The court next found that at least some of the funds in the
account were drug proceeds from the defendant's narcotics en-
terprise, because a substantial portion of the balance was gen-
erated from large cash deposits "equal to approximately twice
the amount that could be accounted for out of legitimate
sources of income."6' As for the checks made out for beeper
services, the court found that because these beepers were used
in connection with the defendant's drug trafficking, the govern-
ment had established its facilitation case under § 1956(a)(1). 69
Finally, the court rejected the facilitation theory as to the mo-
bile phones, rent payments, and checks for cash, because the
government failed to prove that these activities played any role
in the drug operation beyond maintaining the defendant's life-
style.7" The court did, however, find that the evidence was suf-
ficient to prove a concealment charge under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)."'
2. Concealment
As an alternative to proving that the defendant intended the
transaction to facilitate the drug enterprise, under 18 U.S.C. §
1956(a)(1)(B)(i),72 the government may prove that the transac-
tion was designed to conceal the nature, location, source, owner-
ship, or control of drug proceeds. An example of a transaction
intended to conceal or disguise the source or ownership of the
67. Id.
68. Id. at 840-41.
69. Id. at 841.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 84142.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
266 [Vol. 28:255
1994] MONEY LAUNDERING AND DRUG TRAFFICKING
funds would be the purchase of money orders under a false
name or in the name of a nominee/third-party.3
Placing assets in a false name or in the name of a nomi-
nee/third-party or "front man" such as a girlfriend, mother,
father, or other relative is a common method used by drug traf-
fickers to conceal or disguise the source of their illicit funds. In
United States v. Beddow, 4 the defendant was convicted of
laundering drug proceeds pursuant to § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) based
on his purchase of a charter boat and emeralds with drug pro-
ceeds and under § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) for his transportation of drug
proceeds to Brazil. 5 At trial, the government showed that the
defendant was involved in drug trafficking by introducing tape
recorded conversations in which the defendant admitted that
drug proceeds were used in connection with the charter boat
and emerald transactions. 6 The government also showed that
the defendant's investing activity involved a large amount of
unexplained wealth." The government introduced evidence
that the defendant had invested in three unsuccessful business
ventures: a restaurant, a charter boat business, and the pur-
chase of $50,000 in uncut emeralds from Brazil. 8 These busi-
ness ventures cost the defendant a total of $100,000 in docu-
mented losses. However, the defendant's tax returns for the
pertinent period revealed little income and virtually no as-
sets. 9 In the charter boat and emerald ventures, the defen-
dant used "front men" to obscure and disguise his ownership.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to support any finding that he carried out any of the
transactions with the requisite intent to conceal the source or
ownership of the funds involved in the transactions." The
73. See United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 713 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied
sub noma., Johnson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 396 (1993) (renovating nightclub with
drug proceeds); United States v. Turner, 975 F.2d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied sub. noma. Dowdy v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1053 (1993) (purchase of building
by nominee corporation); United States v. Isabel, 945 F.2d 1193 (1st Cir. 1991) (pay-
roll check scheme).
74. 957 F.2d 1330 (6th Cir. 1992).
75. Id. at 1332.
76. Id. at 1334-35.
77. Id. at 1333.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1334.
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Sixth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument. As for the
emerald transaction, the court found that the defendant was
the true owner of the stones and that he used a "front man" to
disguise his ownership interest."' As for the charter boat
transaction, the court found that the evidence of the defendant's
"convoluted financial dealings"82 with his bank and the charter
boat business supported the jury's finding that the defendant
intended to disguise the source of the funds.'
In concealment cases based on the purchases of assets, the
government is required to show that the property was used to
conceal the source of the funds. In United States v. Baker,"
one defendant was convicted of money laundering under the
concealment provision of § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). The conviction was
based on the theory that he concealed his drug proceeds by
having a friend use the defendant's cash to purchase a boat for
him while keeping title to the boat in his friend's name.85 At
trial, the government first showed that the defendant was in-
volved in drug trafficking, and introduced evidence that the
defendant's friend purchased a boat for $30,000 in cash.86 The
government, however, was unable to establish that the defen-
dant participated in the transaction. Moreover, although the
purchase was shown to have taken place, the boat was never
found or otherwise identified. The government did produce some
evidence that the defendant referred to owning or possessing a
boat during two monitored telephone calls and that the defen-
dant was seen pulling a boat on a trailer on one occasion."
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the conviction. First,
the court found that because the government had failed to iden-
tify the particular boat involved in the transaction, there could
be no showing that property or a "vehicle" had been used by
81. Id. at 1335.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 985 F.2d 1248 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub noma., Blackwell v. United
States, 62 U.S.L.W. 3451 (1994).
85. Id. at 1251-52. The court's decision also mentions a conviction under §
1956(a)(1)(B)(ii). Id. at 1250. However, this subsection is not discussed or referred to
again.
86. Id. at 1252.
87. Id. at 1252-53.
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the defendant to convert the proceeds.88 Second, the court held
that the government failed to identify the source of the money
as drug proceeds.89 The court refused to find that all funds
associated with him were automatically presumed to be illicit
funds just because the defendant was involved in drug traffick-
ing. Even when the court assumed the funds were drug pro-
ceeds, it held that the government's failure to establish any
relationship between the defendant and the money used in the
transaction was fatal to any conviction."
Even in cases where the funds involved in the transaction
are admittedly drug proceeds, whether there has been an at-
tempt to conceal the source of the funds centers on whether the
defendant attempted to divorce himself from either the source
of the funds used in the transaction and/or the property used
as a vehicle to convert the drug money. For example, in United
States v. Sanders,9 the defendant was convicted on two counts
of money laundering under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) based upon two
separate automobile purchases.92 The defendant made two car
purchases approximately five months apart. It was undisputed
that a portion of the purchase price of 6ach vehicle was paid for
with drug trafficking proceeds.9 The first car was purchased
with a loan, $3535 in cash (the drug proceeds), and a trade-
in. 4 The defendant personally handled the transaction with
her husband, and they both used the vehicle after its purchase.
Again, it was undisputed that the second car was purchased, in
part, with $11,400 in drug proceeds. 5 In connection with mak-
ing the second purchase, the defendant and her husband ap-
peared at the dealership to negotiate the sale, made the pur-
chase, and placed the title to the car in the name of the
husband's daughter.96 At trial, the defendant was convicted of
88. Id. at 1254.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 929 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 143 (1991).
92. Id. at 1468.
93. See id. at 1472.
94. Id. at 1471.
95. See id. at 1472.
96. Id. at 1471.
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money laundering under the concealment provision of §
1956(a)(1)(B)(i).9 7
The Tenth Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction and
held that these facts were not sufficient to sustain a conceal-
ment charge. The court specifically found that because both the
defendant and her husband had openly participated in purchas-
es that were readily identifiable, there was no intention to
conceal the source of the proceeds." In reaching the decision
to nullify the money laundering conviction the Sanders court
held:
[B]y the express terms of the statute, a design to conceal or
disguise the source or nature of the proceeds is a necessary
element for a money laundering conviction. In other words,
the purpose of the money laundering statute is to reach
commercial transactions intended (at least in part) to dis-
guise the relationship of the item purchased with the per-
son providing the proceeds used to make the purchase were
obtained from illegal activities. 9
3. Evasion of State or Federal Reporting Requirement
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) and (a)(2)(B)(ii) prohibit transac-
tions or transfers designed to evade a state or federal currency
reporting requirement. 0 The detection of the movement of
large amounts of cash has always been considered a natural
byproduct of drug trafficking as well as other cash intensive
criminal enterprises. With this in mind, Congress established
reporting requirements for domestic' and international 2
cash transactions in amounts of $10,000 or more. In 31 U.S.C.
§ 5313, a financial institution is required to file a report with
the Internal Revenue Service for virtually all cash transactions
involving more than $10,000. Section 5324 prohibits any indi-
vidual from structuring cash transactions with the intent to
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1472.
99. Id.
100. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
101. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324(a), 5313(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
102. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324(b), 5316 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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evade or cause a financial institution not to file the currency
transaction report."3 In addition, § 5324(a)(2) prohibits any-
one from causing a financial institution to file a currency
transaction report with material omissions or misstatements of
fact. Furthermore, federal law requires that an individual or
institution file a report with the Customs Service for all inter-
national transactions or transfers of cash in excess of
$10,000.1°4 Section 5324(a) prohibits anyone from causing the
failure to file such a report.
In United States v. Jackson,"5 the defendant was convicted
of money laundering under the evasion provision of §
1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) based on his purchase of a car. The defendant
paid in seven installments of cash and cashier's checks, varying
in amounts from $25 to $6,772.25.l1" At trial, the government
presented six witnesses who testified that the defendant was
involved in drug trafficking and that he possessed a substantial
amount of unexplained wealth."7 The defendant was convicted
and appealed. On appeal, the defendant argued that the evi-
dence was insufficient to prove that he intended to avoid a
state or federal reporting requirement.' The Seventh Circuit
rejected the defendant's argument, holding that the defendant's
payments in cash and cashier's checks, each less than $10,000,
adequately supported his conviction under the avoidance provi-
sion of § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii). ' 9
103. See United States v. Rogers, 962 F.2d 342, 345 (4th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Wollman, 945 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1991). Recently, the United States Supreme
Court settled the conflict among circuits as to whether the government must prove
that the evading defendant had knowledge of the illegality of his transaction structur-
ing. In Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994), the Court held that the prose-
cution must prove the defendant acted with the knowledge his conduct was unlawful
in order to establish a willful violation of the anti-structuring law. Id. at 662. The
Court, however, recognized that this burden of proof could be met by using circum-
stantial evidence. Id. at 663 n.19.
104. 31 U.S.C. § 5316.
105. 983 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1992).
106. Id. at 760, 764.
107. Id. at 766.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 767. In United States v. Ortiz, 738 F. Supp. 1394 (S.D. Fla. 1990), the
defendant attempted to ship a water heater filled with $497,170 in cash to Colombia.
Id. at 1396. Law enforcement agents intercepted the shipment in Miami, Florida.
After his arrest, the defendant acknowledged that the money contained in the water
heater was drug proceeds. Id. at 1396-97. On motion to dismiss, the district court
upheld the indictment under § 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii) for attempting to transport drug pro-
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III. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
A. Introduction
There are three central elements under a § 1956(a)(1),
(a)(2)(B) or (a)(3) charge." ° First, the government must prove
that the funds involved in the transaction were drug proceeds.
Second, the government must prove that the defendant knew
that the funds were drug proceeds. Finally, the prosecution
must prove that the defendant knew that the transaction was
intended to fulfill one of the illicit purposes mentioned in the
statute."' Evidence relating to the drug proceeds element and
the two knowledge elements will make up the core of the
government's case.
Typically, a money laundering charge is brought against a
defendant based on one of the following four fact patterns.
First, the defendant is involved in drug trafficking and the
money laundering charge arises from his participation in a
transaction involving funds specifically and directly linked to a
particular drug deal. Second, the defendant is involved in drug
trafficking and the money laundering charge arises out of his
participation in a transaction involving funds not traced to any
particular drug distribution. Third, the defendant is not directly
involved in the purchase or sale of narcotics, but is involved in
a transaction .involving funds specifically and directly linked to
drug trafficking. Fourth, the defendant is not directly involved
in the purchase or sale of narcotics, but participates in a trans-
action involving funds that are circumstantially traced or linked
to a narcotics enterprise.
Although a money laundering charge may be based on these
four distinct fact patterns, whether the funds were drug pro-
ceeds, whether the defendant knew the funds were drug pro-
ceeds, and ivhether the defendant knew of the intended illicit
design of the transaction often collapse into one analysis. This
analysis concentrates on the particular circumstances indicating
ceeds with the intent to avoid the transaction reporting requirement 31 U.S.C. §§
5316 and 5322. Id. at 1404.
110. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(3) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
111. See United States v. Jackson, 983 F.2d 757, 766 (7th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1992).
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the source of the funds and the characteristics of the individu-
als involved in the handling of the funds."
When the defendant is involved in both the underlying drug
transaction and the money laundering transaction, the relation-
ship between the defendant and the unlawful activity is inti-
mate. As a consequence, the drug proceeds and knowledge ele-
ments are obvious."' For example, evidence that the defen-
dant engaged in a large cocaine transaction generating
$200,000 in cash revenue and, a week later, purchased
$150,000 in real estate in his mother's name and paid for the
property in cash would easily establish the drug proceeds and
knowledge element. Rarely, however, is the government's evi-
dence so precise. More likely, the government's evidence would
be more remote; for example, during the time the son was en-
gaged in drug trafficking, his mother purchased $150,000 in
real estate and paid cash.
Under the other three scenarios, the link between the funds
involved in the transaction and the underlying unlawful activity
generating the funds is more estranged. As a consequence,
although the prosecution need not trace the funds to a specific
drug transaction,"' the government is still required to show
that the transaction involved drug proceeds and that the defen-
dant knew both that the transaction involved drug proceeds
and that the transaction was designed to fulfill one of the illicit
purposes under the statute. The prosection can meet this bur-
den of proof with circumstantial evidence. This circumstantial
evidence should be tantamount to a complete dissection of the
transaction and the individuals involved in the suspected money
laundering scheme. In addition, this circumstantial evidence
should be supplemented with expert witness testimony explain-
ing a drug dealer's typical method of laundering his cash profits
or the usual meanings of terms used by money launderers."5
For example, an expert witness could testify that drug dealers
112. See, e.g., United States v. Isabel, 945 F.2d 1193, 1202 (1st Cir. 1991) (examin-
ing source of funds, statements made during the transactions, statements characteriz-
ing source of the funds, and knowledge of prior narcotics arrests in finding that the
funds involved in the transaction were drug proceeds).
113. United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 1991).
114. Jackson, 935 F.2d at 840.
115. United States v. Fuller, 974 F.2d 1474, 1482-83 (5th Cir. 1992).
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typically use wire services in furtherance of their drug activi-
ties.'16 By combining circumstantial evidence and expert testi-
mony to establish the existence of criminal activity with the
defendant's deliberate avoidance of learning of this activity, the
prosecution should be entitled to a willful blindness, deliberate
ignorance, or conscious avoidance instruction on the three core
issues of the prosecution."7
B. Drug Proceeds
Proof that the funds were drug proceeds may be established
with circumstantial evidence. In United States v. Blackman,"18
the defendant asserted that the government failed to meet its
burden of proof because neither his wire transfers nor his pay-
ment to an auto dealership were traceable to any particular
drug sale."' The Eighth Circuit refused to infer such a precise
burden on the prosecution. The court held that the
government's proof that the defendant was involved in drug
trafficking and his inability to demonstrate a legitimate source
of income, combined with the particular nature of the transac-
tions was sufficient to prove that the funds were drug pro-
ceeds. 2 ° The court explained that:
The government relied on evidence of [the defendant's]
involvement in drug trafficking and his lack of any legiti-
mate source of income to raise the inference that the money
wired to Los Angeles and paid to [the auto dealership]
represented proceeds from drug distribution. While the
government can point to no specific drug sale that produced
the money, we do not believe that the government's evi-
dence fails to make out a claim of money laundering under
18 U.S.C. § 1956. We do not read the statute to require
that the government trace the proceeds to a particular sale.
116. United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1990).
117. United States v. Breque, 964 F.2d 381, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The term 'de-
liberate ignorance' 'denotes a conscious effort to avoid positive knowledge of a fact
which is an element of an offense charged, the defendant choosing to remain, igno-
rant so he can plead lack of positive knowledge in the event he should be caught.')
(quoting U.S. v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 935 (1978)).
118. 904 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1990).
119. Id. at 1256.
120. Id. at 1257.
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We do agree with [the defendant] that the government
cannot rely exclusively on proof that a defendant charged
with using proceeds from an unlawful activity has no legiti-
mate source of income. However, as the Third Circuit noted
in United States v. Massac, 867 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1989)
evidence of a defendant's use of wire service to transfer
cash to Haiti, combined with evidence of defendant's drug
trafficking, is sufficient to sustain a conviction of money
laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)." 1
C. Knowledge/Drug Proceeds
In addition to using circumstantial evidence to prove that the
funds were drug proceeds, this type of evidence can also be
used to prove that the defendant knew the funds were drug
proceeds. In United States v. Gallo,122 the defendant was
charged with money laundering under the facilitation provision
of § 1956(a)(1)' based on his transportation of $299,985 in
cash in his car on an interstate highway.' The prosecution
successfully established that the defendant knew the money in
his car was narcotics proceeds by introducing evidence of a
concert of action between the defendant and two suspected drug
dealers."s More specifically, the government introduced evi-
121. Id. (footnotes omitted). In United States v. McDougald, 990 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.
1993), the Sixth Circuit rejected the inference relied on in Blackman. In McDougald,
the defendant was convicted of money laundering based on his purchase of a car for
a drug dealer. Id. at 260. In connection with the sale, the defendant had the car
titled in his name, thereby concealing the identity of the true owner. Id. On appeal,
the court held that although the government showed that the funds used to purchase
the car were attributable to a drug dealer, this evidence was insufficient to prove
that the funds were drug proceeds because there was no evidence that drug traffick-
ing was the defendant's sole source of income. Id. at 261-62. The court rejected the
inference relied on in Blackman and held that the mere fact that the funds were
traceable to a drug dealer does not give rise to an inference that the monies are
drug proceeds. Id. at 261-62. Moreover, the court found that, although the defendant's
concealment of the identity of the vehicle's true owner veneered the transaction with
suspicion, it was not sufficient to prove an intent to conceal. Id. at 262. The court
found that the defendant's reasons for misrepresenting the true ownership of the car
could be attributable to several motivations and not just an intent to launder drug
proceeds. Id.
122. 927 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1991).
123. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(1988).
124. 927 F.2d at 822.
125. Id.
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dence that the defendant received the money from a known
drug dealer, that the money was wrapped in aluminum-foil
packets, that fingerprints of another suspected drug dealer were
found on the money, and that after he was arrested the defen-
dant made two false exculpatory statements about the car and
the cash.126
In United States v. Martin,"' the defendant was convicted
of money laundering based on his purchase of stock with pro-
ceeds from marijuana sales. 8 The defendant appealed his
conviction on the ground that the government failed to intro-
duce sufficient evidence to prove that he knew that drug pro-
ceeds were used to purchase stock and that the transaction was
designed to conceal ownership of the proceeds. 9 The Eighth
Circuit upheld the defendant's conviction and found that the
circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove that the defen-
dant knew the funds were drug proceeds. 30 The court held
that evidence of the stock purchases with cash, together with
the defendant's admissions during several conversations that
the funds used to purchase the stock were generated from mari-
juana sales, were sufficient to support the jury's finding that
the funds were drug proceeds.' 3' In addition, the issuance of
the stock certificates in the name of a nominee/third-party was
sufficient to prove that the defendant intended to conceal the
source of the funds.3 2
Discussions between individuals involved in laundering drug
proceeds is usually cryptic and typically the conversations do
not explicitly refer to the funds as "drug money." Consequently,
in sting cases under § 1956(a)(3), the undercover agent must
walk a thin line between representing that the funds are drug
money and using the typically obscure language of a drug deal-
er. As a result, the central issue regarding knowledge involves
the question of whether the agent or confidential informant
sufficiently disclosed or represented that the funds were drug
126. Id.
127. 933 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1991).
128. Id. at 610.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 611.
131. Id. at 610.
132. Id.
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proceeds. Again, circumstantial evidence plays an essential role.
In United States v. Breque,"'3 the defendant was convicted un-
der the sting provision of § 1956(a)(3). The conviction arose out
of the defendant's operation of a money exchange service in
Texas."' In particular, the defendant's conviction was based
on seven transactions in which he exchanged dollars given to
him by an undercover agent for Mexican pesos. The transac-
tions occurred over an eight-month period and involved a total
of over $200,000.15
During several of the transactions the undercover agent made
veiled references to drug dealing and there were discussions
between the agent and the defendant about money launder-
ing.136 In addition, the defendant never asked the agent for
any information necessary to complete a currency transaction
report, and a report was never filed relating to any of the seven
money exchanges.3 7 Finally, the agent was charged a service
fee or commission for each of the exchanges, and early on this
fee was increased, according to the defendant, as a result of the
"dangers involved" in handling the agent's money. 8'
The defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that the
evidence was insufficient to show that he knew that the funds
were drug proceeds; or stated another way, that the undercover
agent represented the funds as drug proceeds.'39 The court
scrutinized the conversations between the agent and the defen-
dant and found that the allusions to drug dealing were strong
enough to support the conviction. 40 In particular, the court
found that the agent's identification of the source of the money
as "people in Florida" and the agent's reference to large sums of
cash which needed to be put in "useable form," combined with
the discussions about "Miami Vice" problems and the seizure of
assets by drug agents, were distinctive to drug trafficking so
that the defendant must have known or understood that the
133. 964 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1253 (1993).
134. Id. at 382.
135. Id. at 383-85.
136. Id. at 383.
137. Id. at 383-84.
138. Id. at 384.
139. Id. at 386.
140. Id.
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money involved in the currency exchanges was drug
proceeds. 4
1
D. Knowledge /Illicit Intent
The defendant's knowledge of the illicit intent of the trans-
action, likewise, can be established by way of circumstantial
evidence . 2 The circuit courts have moved resolutely not in-
crementally on this evidentiary point. In United States v.
Campbell, the Fourth Circuit was presented a case where
the defendant was not involved in drug trafficking and the
funds involved in the transaction, although linked to a drug
dealer, were not directly linked to a particular drug deal. In
Campbell, a real estate agent was convicted of money launder-
ing under the concealment provision set forth in §
1956(a)(1)(B)(i)' T based on her sale of real estate to a drug
dealer." 5 The defendant was hired by an individual involved
in drug trafficking. This client represented himself to be the
owner of an automobile customizing service. 46 Over the course
of five weeks, the defendant met with her client approximately
once a week. During these meetings the defendant showed a
total of ten to twelve houses.4 ' The client would arrive at
these meetings driving a Porsche, and always had a cellular
phone with him.'48 At one point, he brought a briefcase con-
taining $20,000 in cash to demonstrate his ability to afford a
house." 9
The client eventually decided to buy a $191,000 house. The
price was subsequently negotiated down to $182,500."5° After
the client was unable to secure a conventional mortgage, he
proposed to the defendant that the sellers drop their price to
$122,500 and accept a $60,000 cash payment "under the
141. Id. at 387.
142. United States v. Isabel, 945 F.2d 1193, 1202-03 (1st Cir. 1991).
143. 977 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1331 (1993).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(9)(1)(B)(i) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
145. 977 F.2d at 855.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 855-56.
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table."'' The sellers accepted this proposition and the client
dealer, thereafter, met the defendant and the sellers and gave
them $60,000 in cash. The money was wrapped in small bun-
dles and carried in a brown paper grocery bag.'52 Following
delivery of the cash to the sellers, the sale went forward and
the property was titled in the client's parents' name.'
The defendant was subsequently convicted of §
1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and § 1957"M charges. However, the district
court granted the defendant's motion for judgment of acquit-
tal."'55 The court held that the government's evidence that the
client had been seen by the defendant driving expensive cars,
had shown the defendant $20,000 in cash to demonstrate his
ability to purchase the property, had paid for the property in
cash, and had titled the property, with the assistance of the
defendant, in his parents' name, was insufficient to establish a
concealment case.'56  The district court found that the
defendant was merely the salesperson who partially oversaw
the transaction.5 7 In addition, the court found that the evi-
dence was insufficient to prove that the defendant intended to
conceal the source of the funds. The court held that her motive
was simply to close the real estate transaction and collect the
resulting commissions, without regard to the source of the
funds involved in the transaction or the effect of the transaction
in concealing the source of the funds. ' Moreover, the district
court found that the evidence that her client demonstrated of
extensive, unexplained wealth was insufficient to support a
finding that the defendant knew that the funds involved in the
real estate sale were drug proceeds.5 9
The Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment of acquittal. The
appellate court first held, and the defendant did not dispute,
that there was adequate circumstantial evidence for the jury to
find that the defendant conducted a financial transaction which
151. Id. at 856.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
155. United States v. Campbell, 777 F. Supp. 1259 (W.D.N.C. 1991).
156. Id. at 1265.
157. Id.
158. 977 F.2d at 857.
159. 777 F. Supp. at 1266.
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involved drug proceeds. 60 The court then recognized that the
central issue was whether there was sufficient evidence for the
jury to find that the defendant knew that: (1) the funds were
drug proceeds; and (2) the transaction was intended or designed
to conceal the source of the funds.'6'
The appellate court first held that the district court erred in
its interpretation of the government's burden of proof on the
question of whether the defendant knew that the transaction
was intended to conceal the source of the funds.6 2 The district
court held that the government was required to prove the de-
fendant intended the transaction to conceal or disguise the
source of the funds. The Fourth Circuit rejected this interpreta-
tion and held that the government was required to prove only
that her client intended the transaction to conceal or disguise
the source and ownership of the funds and that the defendant
knew of this design or intent.'63 The defendant's own motiva-
tion or intent was not deemed relevant. The critical factor was
not her intent, but rather her knowledge of her client's in-
tent." Moreover, this burden of proof was "softened" by the
doctrine of willful blindness. Thus, the government was only
required to prove that the defendant purposefully and deliber-
ately avoided learning of her client's intentions.6 '
The court then held that if the defendant knew the funds
were drug proceeds, "then the under the table transfer of
$60,000 in cash" was sufficient "by itself' to support the finding
that the defendant "knew, or was willfully blind" to the fraudu-
lent or illicit purpose of the transaction.'66 Thus, whether the
evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the defen-
dant knew that her client's purpose in undertaking the transac-
tion was to conceal or disguise the source and ownership of
drug proceeds pivoted on whether the defendant was aware
that the funds were drug proceeds." 7 The court found that in
160. 977 F.2d at 856.
161. Id. at 857.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 857-58.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 858.
167. Id.
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this particular case, the knowledge component of the money
laundering statute collapses into a single inquiry: did the defen-
dant know that the funds involved in the transaction "were de-
rived from an illegal source?"16 If yes, this fact combined with
the fraudulent nature of the transaction would be sufficient to
support a finding that: (1) the defendant knew that the
transaction involved illicit proceeds; and (2) the transaction was
designed to conceal or disguise the source and ownership of the
funds.
169
On the question of whether the defendant knew that the
funds were drug proceeds, the district court was, again, found
to have misstated the government's burden. The district court
held that the prosecution was required to show the defendant's
particular "knowledge of the drug dealer's activities."7 The
appellate court rejected this narrow interpretation. The court
held that the government need only show that the funds repre-
sented "proceeds of some form of unlawful activity" and was not
required to prove a particular or specific violation under the
statute. 7 ' At trial, the government's evidence showed the
particular characteristics of the individual providing the
funds.'72 By tainting the individual, the government attempted
to taint the funds and "negate the defendant's credibility.'
7 3
The Fourth Circuit found the evidence persuasive. The court
viewed the government's "life-style" evidence (expensive car,
large amounts of cash, cellular phone, absence from represented
legitimate business for long periods of time during normal
working hours), combined with a statement by the defendant
that her client's money might be "drug money" and the fraudu-
lent nature of the transaction, was sufficient to support the
jury's finding that the funds were drug proceeds and that the
defendant "deliberately closed her eyes to what would otherwise
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. United States v. Campbell, 777 F. Supp. 1259, 1265 (M.D.N.C. 1991).
171. 977 F.2d at 857 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1956(9)(1)). It should be noted, however,
that the appellate court found the distinction of little consequence in this case, as the
entirety of the government's evidence was intended to prove the defendant knew her
client was a drug dealer. Id.
172. Id. at 859.
173. Id. The defendant maintained throughout the trial that she mistakenly be-
lieved the drug dealer was a legitimate businessman.
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have been obvious to her."74 Thus, the court concluded that
the evidence supported the jury's finding that the defendant
knew of or was willfully blind to the fact that her client was a
drug dealer, that the funds were drug proceeds, and that her
client intended the transaction to conceal the source of the
funds.75
The theory that a defendant may be willfully blind to the
truth was relied on by the Eighth Circuit to sustain a money
laundering conviction in United States v. Long.'76 In Long, the
defendants were charged with money laundering under the
concealment provision set forth in § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).' The de-
fendants were owners and operators of three automobile dealer-
ships in the metropolitan St. Paul area and were charged based
on the sale of numerous vehicles to drug dealers. 7 ' At trial,
the government introduced evidence that during a three-year
period certain defendants structured numerous sales for the
drug dealers by accepting cash payments of under $10,000 and
174. Id.
175. Id. Recently the Fourth Circuit affirmed that circumstantial evidence is suffi-
cient to sustain a money laundering conviction in United States v. Winfield, 997 F.2d
1076 (4th Cir. 1993). In Winfield, the defendant was convicted of laundering drug
proceeds in connection with the purchase of two houses in Petersburg, Virginia. Id. at
1076. The defendant appealed her conviction on the ground that the evidence did not
directly connect her to the transactions. Thus, the defendant argued that she did not
"conduct" a financial transaction as required in § 1956(a)(1). Id. at 1079.
The Fourth Circuit rejected the defendant's contention and held that the cir-
cumstantial evidence was sufficient to show the defendant's link to the purchases. Id.
at 1079-80. As for the first property, the defendant's son dealt with the real estate
agent, t~ndered the deposit, and titled the property in his name. However, the court
found that the defendant's statement that she desired to purchase the property and
later, after the house was purchased, that she intended to evict a tenant combined
with the defendant living in the house and conducting her drug dealing from the
house sufficiently showed the defendant's link such as to find that she conducted the
transaction. Id.
As for the second house, the court found the defendant's purchase of the house
next door, contact with the previous owner to buy the house, and the use of the
defendant's daughter's name for the title was, again, sufficient to prove that the de-
fendant conducted a financial transaction. Id. at 1080.
176. 977 F.2d 1264, 1271 (8th Cir. 1992).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) states that a person will be guilty of money laun-
dering when they know the transaction in question is designed "to conceal or disguise
the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity." Id.
178. 977 F.2d at 1267-68.
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arranging conventional financing."' Typically, when the drug
dealer advised the defendants that he had no legitimate source
of income to support a loan application, the drug dealer would,
nevertheless, be assured by the defendants that financing could
be arranged.18 The defendants would then secure financing
for the purchases by filing false loan applications on behalf of
the drug dealers. Once the financing was approved, the defen-
dants would receive an under the table payment. 8' The gov-
ernment also presented evidence that the defendants made com-
ments during the course of these transactions indicating that
they suspected that the purchasers were involved in drug
trafficking.'82
The defendants appealed their conviction principally on the.
ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish that: (1)
they knew that the funds involved in the transaction were drug
proceeds; (2) the transactions were designed to conceal the
source of the funds; and, (3) they knew that the purchases were
designed to conceal the source of the funds.'" The court re-
jected the defendants' arguments on each point. First, the court
found that the structuring of the cash payment, references to
the purchasers as drug dealers, and use of false loan applica-
tions combined with the under the table payments was suffi-
cient to find that the defendants knew the cars were being
purchased with drug proceeds."M As for the intent to conceal
the source of the funds, the court held that because the trans-
actions were designed to permit the "drug dealers to make drug
money appear to be money earned through work in a legitimate
job," the transactions fell plainly within the purview of the
concealment provision of the statute.'85 Finally, the court held
that because the defendants knew the funds involved in the
transactions were drug proceeds and that the purchases were
designed to conceal the source of the funds, the evidence sup-
ported an inference that the defendants were deliberately igno-
rant to the intended design of the transactions. 88 Thus, the
179. Id. at 1267.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1268.
183. Id. at 1269.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1270.
186. Id. at 1271. The evidence also established that one defendant took steps to
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jury was also "warranted in finding that [the defendants] knew
[the] transactions were designed to conceal or disguise the
source of the drug proceeds."'87
The Campbell and Long decisions establish that in cases
where the defendant has either by design or circumstance dis-
tanced himself from the underlying drug enterprise and is
charged with money laundering based on his participation in a
transaction involving drug proceeds, the government may meet
its burden of proving knowledge by proving that the defendant
knew or was willfully blind to the source of the money and the
intent to conceal. This burden can be met with the introduction
of circumstantial evidence showing deliberate ignorance to the
obvious truth. For example, evidence regarding the particular
manner and method in which the defendant handled the
transaction may be sufficient to show that it was obvious that
the funds were drug proceeds and that the transaction was
designed to fulfill one of the illicit purposes under the statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because of the cash-intensive nature of drug trafficking, the
huge profits, and the appendage needed to remove the taint
and association with the narcotics enterprise, the federal money
laundering statute has come to be primarily about drugs and
drug money. Beyond understanding the complexity of the statu-
tory elements themselves, the evidence necessary to sustain a §
1956 prosecution is formidable. In particular, the case typically
centers on three significant evidentiary issues: (1) whether the
evidence sufficiently shows that the funds, were drug proceeds;
(2) whether the defendant knew the funds were drug proceeds;
and, (3) whether the defendant knew of the illicit purpose of
the transaction or transfer. Recently, the federal circuit courts
have held that circumstantial evidence, detailing the charac-
teristics of the individuals involved in the transaction, and the
particular manner and method in which the transaction was
carried out, often combined with expert testimony, may be suffi-
remain ignorant of the details of the illegal transactions. Id. This was a proper foun-
dation for the trial court to include a jury instruction on willful blindness. Id.
187. Id. at 1270.
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cient to satisfy these evidentiary burdens. Thus, the govern-
ment may meet its burden of proving the critical elements of
the money laundering offense by introducing circumstantial
evidence that the defendant was deliberately ignorant or will-
fully blind to the obvious truth regarding the source of the
funds and the illicit intent of the transaction. If the defendant
fails to demure to indications that he is involved in a
transaction involving drug proceeds, the consequences are not
trivial.

